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This paper tries to explain why most migration flows show some observable jumps in 
their processes, a phenomenon that seems to be sympathetic with the characteristic of 
irreversibility of migration. We present a real option model where the choice to migrate 
depends on both the differential wage between the host country and the country of 
origin, and on the probability of being fully integrated into the host country. The 
theoretical results show that the optimal migration decision of a single individual 
consists of waiting before migrating in a (coordinate) mass of individuals. The 
dimension of the migration flow depends on the behavioural characteristics of the ethnic 
groups: the more "sociable" they are, the larger the size of the wave and the lower the 
differential wage required. A second part of the paper is devoted to calibrating the 
model and simulating some migration flows to Italy in the last decade. The calibration is 
able to replicate the observable migration jumps in the short term. In particular, the 
calibrated model is able to conjecture the induced labour demand elasticity level of the 
host country and the behavioural rationale of the migrants. 
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The beginning of this century was characterised by a great mobility of money,
products and people. Therefore, it is not surprising that a wide range of eco-
nomic and sociological literature studies migration waves and tries to detect
relations of cause and eﬀect. However, by observing the migration phe-
nomenon, it can be seen that its dynamics are in general characterised by
some jumps in the migration ﬂows, especially at the beginning of its process,
followed by gradual waves. What could be the causes for these particular
dynamics? In economic literature, the main variable that aﬀects the decision
t om i g r a t ei ss u r e l yt h ew a g ed i ﬀerential between the host country and the
country of origin (Todaro, 1969; Langley, 1974; Hart, 1975; Borjas, 1990,
1994). Nevertheless, even if wage diﬀerential is important, it is not suﬃ-
cient to totally explain migrant behaviour: evidence seems to stress the focal
role of community networks in the migrant’s choice (Boyd, 1989; Bauer and
Zimmermann, 1997; Moretti, 1998; Winters et al., 2001; Bauer et al., 2002;
Coniglio, 2003; Munshi, 2001, 2003; Heitmueller, 2003). Moretti (1998), for
example, with an alternative model to Todaro’s, ﬁnds evidence that both the
timing and the destination of migration could be explained by the presence
of social networks in the host country.
Furthermore, the fact that migration decision is in many cases highly ir-
reversible is a third element that may help to explain the presence of jumps
in the migration ﬂows. In this respect, Burda (1995), following a real option
approach, implements Sjaastad’s assumption (1962) that describes migration
choice in terms of investment. Burda’s results show that individuals prefer
to wait before migrating, even if the present value of the wage diﬀerential
is positive, because of the uncertainty and the sunk costs associated with
migration 1. Subsequently Khwaja (2002) and Anam et al., (2004) devel-
oped Burda’s approach by describing the role of uncertainty in the migration
decision.
The aim of this paper is to merge in a uniﬁed framework the real option
approach of investment decision and the works on network eﬀects applied to
the analysis of migration ﬂows.
Assimilating the decision of each individual to migrate to a new country
1Investment is deﬁned as the act of incurring an immediate cost in the expectation of
future payoﬀ. However, when the immediate cost is sunk (at least partially) and there
is uncertainty over future rewards, the timing of the investment decision becomes crucial
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p.3).
2as a decision on an irreversible investment, we investigate the role played by
social networks to help the immigrants integrate in the host country, where
an immigrant is completely integrated when his economic and social status
is no diﬀerent from the native one. We do this considering the opportunity
that each immigrant becomes a member of a network (a community) of ho-
mogeneous individuals, located in the host country. The community helps
the immigrants to obtain a higher wage or improve their labour condition if
there are strong ties among the members ("positive network externalities").
The greater the size of the community, the higher the number of ties, the
higher the ﬂow of information on the job opportunities, and therefore the
higher the probability of integrating.
Nevertheless, if the number of immigrants continues to increase, labour
competition as well as higher alienation2 among immigrants inside the com-
munity may reduce their net beneﬁts ("negative network externalities").
The struggle between these two forces is captured by an inverted U-shaped
beneﬁt function which follows directly by modelling the probability of each
immigrant being totally integrated in the host country àl aB a s s(1969). The
Bass model3 well describes the "behavioural rationale" of migration ﬂows by
focusing on the role played by two kinds of immigrants: the innovators or
individualists, and the imitators. The innovators are those individuals that
decide to migrate independently of the decisions of others. The imitators are
those individuals inﬂuenced by the number of previous migrants: they share
information among themselves and tend to establish a network. The weight
of each diﬀe r e n tt y p eo fi m m i g r a n ti n ﬂuences the timing of migration and
then the size of the community.
Finally, we calibrate the model and simulate some migration ﬂows to Italy
in the last decade by using the ISTAT data. The results ﬁt the theoretical
approach and are able to replicate the observable migration jumps.
On the one hand, the higher the ties among the individuals, the larger
t h ed i m e n s i o no ft h ew a v ew i l lb e . O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,t h ep r e s e n c eo f
congestion in the community and/or strong competition among workers in
the host country delays entry.
2This is the case in which the members of the incumbent population discontinue their
attraction of immigrants (see Heitmueller (2003)).
3The Bass model was originally built to study the diﬀusion of new durable products
and largely adopted in marketing literature.
32M i g r a t i o n j u m p s
We analyse the four main foreign ﬂows coming into Italy at the end of the
last decade: Albanians, Chinese, Filipinos and Romanians4. Figure 1 below
shows the migration ﬂows and their growth rates in the period considered.
All the data are taken from the ISTAT database. For the sake of complete-
ness, Figure 2 also shows the wage diﬀerentials in the same period. These
are obtained from the World Bank International Comparison Programme




























































Figure 1: Migration jumps
4The same analysis is applied to Italian ﬂows to the USA in the period between 1954
and 1984 in Vergalli S., ”Migration Dynamics”, Ph.D. thesis, 2005, University of Padua.






















Figure 2: Wage levels
For all the four ﬂows, it is evident that the migration process is not
smooth. It shows jumps in its dynamics. In particular, this happens after a
certain number of years characterised by low waves, as if a mass of individuals
is waiting for something happen before deciding to migrate.
We can also observe that the wage diﬀerential cannot be considered the
main variable driving migration ﬂows. In all cases (except, partially, for
Romania and Albania), the jumps do not occur in combination with a steady
rise in the relative wage levels, as stressed by Moretti (1998).
Why do they wait before taking their decision to migrate? What are
they waiting for? And why do they move in a mass? We try to answer these
questions by examining whether the characteristic of investment of migration
and the role of ethnic groups, behind any migration decision, can explain the
migration jumps observed in Figure 1.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 3 presents the model and
the basic assumptions. Section 4 develops the theoretical framework that
combines real option theory and the network eﬀects, namely the optimal mi-
gration strategy in the presence of positive and negative externalities. Section
5 calibrates the model and Section 6 makes some simulations which conﬁrm
the theoretical results. Finally, section 7 summarises the conclusions.
3 The Model
We assume that an individual that migrates to another country is completely
integrated when his economic and social status is no diﬀerent from the na-
5tive one. Nevertheless, the timing of the migrant’s integration suﬀers from
a phenomenon of attrition because of the lack of information about the host
country and its labour market. We also assume that in the host country a
homogeneous group of people (a community/ a network) exists that can help
each immigrant to increase his probability of integration. The larger the size
of the community, the closer the ties among its members and then the higher
the level of the integration probability. The number of ties also depends on
idiosyncratic characteristics of the of immigrants, that we call "behavioural
rationale" using the Bass terminology. That is, the more "sociable" an indi-
vidual or a group of individuals, the stronger and the higher the number of
ties they have.
3.1 The basic assumptions
Our main assumptions are the following:
1. At any time t a risk-neutral6 individual is free to decide to migrate to a
new country discounting future beneﬁts (the wage diﬀerential between
t h eh o s tc o u n t r ya n dt h ec o u n t r yo fo r i g i n )a tt h ec o n s t a n ti n t e r e s tr a t e
ρ.
2. When the migrant arrives in a host country, he receives only a percentage
ξ<1 of the host wage as ﬁrst entry wage7.S od e ﬁning wo
i as the wage
of his country of origin (where i is the country), we are able to write
the diﬀerential wage as a percentage of the wage of the host country:
ξw− w
o





3. In the host country there is a community of ethnically homogeneous in-
dividuals that helps each member to integrate with the host labour
market (or to obtain a legal job if he is working on the illegal market).
When the immigrant is completely integrated, he gets the diﬀerence
between the legal host current market wage w and the wage of his




i ≡ [1 − w
o
i/w]w ≡ φiw
6See Burda (1995), Khwaja (2002) and Locher (2002) for the use of this assumption.
7Empirical evidence shows that this is true whether the migrant ﬁnds a legal or an
illegal job (see Chiswick,1978; Borjas, 1990; Massey, 1987).
64. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the country-speciﬁc percentages
φ
0
i and φi (φ
0
i ≤ φi) are constant over time8.
5. Each individual enters a new country undertaking a single irreversible
investment which requires an initial sunk cost K.
6. T h es i z eo ft h ei m m i g r a n tﬂow dn is inﬁnitesimally small compared to the
total number of previous immigrants n.
7 Finally, the inverse labour demand for immigrants in the host country at




where θ is a labour-demand-speciﬁcs h o c k ,ζ<0 is the elasticity and
w is the average wage of the host country9.
We introduce the uncertainty in the model by assuming that:
8. The labour-demand-speciﬁcs h o c kθ follows a Brownian motion:
dθ(t)=αθ(t)dt + σθ(t)dW(t) (2)
with θ(t0)=θ and α, σ > 0 are constant over time. The component
dW(t) is a Weiner disturbance deﬁned as dW(t)=ε(t)
√
dt,w h e r e
ε(t) ∼ N(0,1) is a white noise stochastic process (Cox and Miller,
1965).
9. The time taken to become perfectly integrated, say τ, is stochastic and
depends on a distribution of probability deﬁned as:
1 − Fτ (t) ≡ Pr(τ>tp t>0) (3)
and its corresponding hazard rate is 10:
pτ (t) ≡
fτ (t)
1 − Fτ (t)
(4)
8We calibrate them as the loss in Purchasing Power Parity with respect to the initial
year of our dataset. See section 5 below.
9There are two implicit assumptions beyond (1). Firstly, that all incumbent immigrants
have a job and that all future immigrants seek a job. Secondly, that w refers to labour
markets that are occupied mainly by immigrants so that we can ignore the role of native
employees (Heitmueller, 2003).
10pτ (t) is the migrant’s conditioned probability of obtaining a better job at time t+dt,
if he has worked at a low wage till t.
7where fτ (t) is the density function or the likelihood of being perfectly
integrated at t.
Each immigrant decides when to enter a new country maximising his net
beneﬁt value deﬁned as the expected discounted stream of wage diﬀerentials
over the planning horizon (taken inﬁnite for simplicity) minus the entry cost
K.
By (1) and assumptions 3-8 the beneﬁts he gets from being completely
integrated at τ are given by11:
























where B(•) accounts for the future evolution of the number of migrants n(t)
, t ≥ τ. The expectation operator Eτ(•) is taken with respect to the random
variables τ and θ(t) (and then n(t)).
Next, taking into account the beneﬁts the immigrant may gain before
















where n(0) = n; θ(0) = θ. By using an indicator function J[τ>t] that assumes
the value one or zero depending on whether the argument is true or false, we
















11If all immigrants face the same instantaneous probability of death λdt,w ec a nd e ﬁne

























where the expectation is now taken only with respect to θ(t) (and n(t)).
If the beneﬁt value function V (•) is known, the optimal migration policy
implies that the return from migration must be at least equal to cost K at
the entry point. In other words, we need to ﬁnd the curve θ
∗ (n(t)) (i.e. the
value of the labour demand shock) at which the n(t)th migrant is indiﬀerent
between immediate entry or waiting another instant12:
V [n(t),θ
∗ ((n(t))] − K =0 (9)
This is what we are going to do in the next section.
3.2 The entry time τ and the network eﬀect
Before turning to the migrant’s optimal policy, we need to model the proba-
bility of integrating (3). We deﬁne two diﬀerent groups of migrants:
• the innovators: those individuals that decide to migrate independently
of the decisions of other individuals in a social system. They are the
pioneers or the individualists: their decision depends on their intrinsic
characteristics.
• the imitators: those individuals inﬂuenced in the timing of migration
by the number of previous migrants. In particular, we refer to the
individuals who follow the innovators. Their particular behavioural
characteristic is their sociality: they have strong ties among themselves
and tend to establish a network13.
12This condition is familiar in the real option theory with the name of matching value
condition (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
13A recent economic approach calls a similar phenomenon herd behaviour, i.e.: "I will
go to where I have observed others go" (Bauer et al. (2002)).
9Following Bass(1969), the probability that perfect integration occurs at
t, given that no integration has yet occurred, is set as a linear function of the
size of the community, i.e.:
pτ (t)=a + bFτ (t) (10)
where Fτ (t) stands for the number of immigrants already entered; a is the
coeﬃcient of innovation, the inﬂuence on entry regardless of the number of
previous members; b is the coeﬃcient of imitation, the impact of previous
members on the probability of entry at time t. By some algebraic operations













where m is the (ﬁxed) total number of immigrants over the planning hori-
zon, which represents the critical "saturation" dimension of the community.
Finally, we get limn→m fτ (t)=0and fτ (t) is concave iff b > a.


























3.3 The beneﬁtf u n c t i o n
Network migration theory suggests that beneﬁt is a positive function in both
wages and network size (Massey et al. 1993). However, by (13), suppressing
t h et i m ef o rt h es a k eo fs i m p l i c i t y ,w ec a nw r i t et h eb e n e ﬁt function per unit
of time as:
π(n,θ) ≡ u(n)θ (14)








and Bass(n) ≡ [a + b−a
m n − b
m2n2].
10Apart from the shock θ each immigrant shares the same "utility" u(n).
T h eo v e r a l ls h a p eo ft h eu(n) is ambiguous: it depends strongly on the
struggle between the competitive eﬀect (i.e. more immigrants reduces wages
depending on the magnitude of the elasticity ζ) and the network eﬀect (i.e.
individuals gain "utility" by increasing the number of fellow countrymen
which increases the probability of integration via the Bass function Bass(n)).
According to the relative magnitude of these two eﬀects, we can observe three
shape of u(n) as in Figure 3.
     u(n)      I       II
u(n)=u(n’)         u(n)
       u(n”)        u(n”)
    n’ n”      n n              n”          n
    III
     u(n)
       n n
Figure 3: Peculiar shape of u(n)
Let’s analyse Figure 3 from quadrant I to quandrant III for decreasing
levels of elasticity, ceteris paribus:
quadrant I
This is the general case for a not very low level of elasticity ζ.Ar e l a t i v e
minimum in n” and a relative maximum in n e x i s tt h a td i v i d et h ef u n c t i o n
into three intervals:
1. In the interval n ∈ (0,n”), the competition eﬀect prevails over the
11network eﬀect: a new entry reduces the beneﬁt more than the gain
caused by cooperation among members of the community.
2. In the interval n ∈ (n”,n) the network eﬀect prevails: the beneﬁt
increases with n until the dimension of the network reaches the level n.
3. In the interval n ∈ (n,m) the competition eﬀect prevails: the beneﬁt
decreases with n until the dimension of the community hits the satura-
tion level m. Competition is coupled with a phenomenon of congestion
as n moves toward m.
As shown in Figure 3, within the interval (0,n”) a level n0 exists such that
u(n0)=u(n). Further, for n>n 0 each immigrant earns beneﬁtl o w e rt h a n
u(n0) until the community size reaches the relative maximum n.T h e ne a c h
immigrant receives a lower beneﬁt if he enters with a community population
n ∈ (n0,n).
Since the critical level of n0 depends on the relative inﬂuence of the com-
petition and network eﬀects, for diﬀerent levels of elasticity we can observe
the following:
quadrant II
Even if for low value of n competition prevails over the network eﬀect,
the latter dominates any other eﬀect as n increases. This implies that for
each individual it is expedient to wait for the maximum beneﬁt u(n) before
entering.
quadrant III
Since ζ → 0 implies that n0 → 0, for very low levels of elasticity, the
beneﬁt function simply assumes an inverse U-shape.
4M i g r a t i o n d y n a m i c s
Applying Itô’s Lemma to (14) and substituting (2) to eliminate dθ,w eg e ta n
expression for the rate of change of π in terms of the shock and the network
size:
dπ = µ(n)πdn+ απdt + σπdw, with π0 ≡ u(n0)θ0 = π (15)
12In (15) the ﬁrst term µ(n) ≡ u0 (n)/u(n) captures the direct eﬀect of
migration ﬂows. Migration inﬂuences the level of beneﬁts through its eﬀect on
the labour market equilibrium depending on the dimension of the community.
In particular, given any value of the shock θ, more immigrants imply a higher
or lower equilibrium level of beneﬁts depending on the presence of positive
µ(n) > 0 or negative µ(n) < 0 network externalities respectively.
4.1 Optimal migration policy for n>n (and <n 0).
If the initial size of the community is n ≥ n (or n 6 n0), we expect migration
to work in the following way. For any ﬁxed n, the beneﬁts per unit of
time move according to the above stochastic process with µ(n)dn =0 .I f
they climb to a certain level π∗ = u(n)θ
∗(n), migration becomes feasible,
the network size increases from n to n + dn and the beneﬁts go downward
along the function u(n).B e n e ﬁts will then continue to move stochastically
without the term µ(n)dn, until another episode of entry occurs14.T h i sc a n
be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If n ≥ n (or n 6 n0), the optimal migration policy is de-












where ρ>αand β1 > 1 is the positive root of the auxiliary quadratic equation
Ψ(β)=1
2σ2β(β − 1) + αβ − ρ =0 .
Proof. See Leahy (1993) and the Appendix
I nt h er e g i o na b o v et h ec u r v e ,i ti so p t i m a lt om i g r a t e :aw a v eo fm i g r a n t s
will enter in a lump to move the beneﬁts level immediately to the threshold
curve. In the region below the curve the optimal policy is inaction: the
i n d i v i d u a l sw a i tu n t i lt h es t o c h a s t i cp r o c e s sθ moves it vertically to θ
∗(n) and
then again a ﬂow of migrants will jump into the host country just enough
not to cross the threshold.
The "utility" threshold that triggers migration by the single migrant in
isolation is identical to that of the individual that correctly anticipates the
14In technical terms, the threshold π∗ becomes an upper reﬂecting barrier on the beneﬁt
process (see Harrison,1985).
13other immigrants’ strategies. This remarkable property, ﬁrst discovered by
Leahy (1993), has an important operative implication: the optimal migration
policy of each individual need not take account of the eﬀect of rivals’ entry.
He can behave competitively as if he is the last to enter15.
4.2 Optimal migration policy for n0 <n<n
For n ∈ (n0,n), the network beneﬁt prevails over the competitive eﬀect and
then we expect the timing of an individual’s entry is inﬂuenced by the entry
decisions of others.
Intuition suggests that Leahy’s result cannot be extended to cover this
case. In other words, a migrant cannot continue to pretend to be the last to
migrate in constructing his optimal entry policy. The gist of our argument is
that there are positive externalities, so the higher the number of members in
the community, the greater the advantage in terms of ﬂow of beneﬁts. This
is evident in the case of an U-shaped beneﬁt function (quadrant III in Figure
3) but it also works for the general case as u(n0)=u(n) and the "utility"
is lower in within (quadrant I in Figure 3). Therefore, although entering
may be proﬁtable, it is more expensive to do it ﬁrst than to enter later on,
when others have already done so. This makes the trigger π∗ = u(n)θ
∗(n) no
longer optimal: each migrant can do better by delaying entry16. Potentially
conﬂicting preferences over appropriation of the positive network beneﬁts
make the immigrants face a choice between individual entry and agreement,
that is between coordinate and non-coordinate entry.
However, as all individuals are subject to the same labour demand stochas-
15In other words, when an individual decides on entry, by pretending to be the last to
migrate, he is ignoring two things: 1) He is thinking that his beneﬁt ﬂow is given by u(n)θ,
with n held ﬁxed forever. Thus, as u0(n) < 0, he is ignoring that future entry by other
members, in response to a higher value of θ, will reduce his "utility". All things being
equal, this would make entry more attractive for the migrant that behaves myopically. 2)
He is unaware that the prospect of future entry by competitors reduces his option value
of waiting. That is, pretending to be the last to migrate, the individual also believes he
still has a valuable option of waiting before making an irreversible decision. All things
being equal, this makes the decision to enter less attractive. The two eﬀects oﬀset each
other, allowing the migrant to act as if he were in isolation (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994,
p. 291).
16The decision problem involved here resembles one of war of attrition where each agent
waits for his rivals to concede (Moretto, 2000).
14tic shock, two equilibrium patterns are possible: either the community re-
mains locked-in at the initial size n0 <n<n, sustained by self-fulﬁlling
pessimistic expectations (inﬁnite delay), or a mass of individuals simulta-
neously rushes to enter. Excluding the former17, we expect entry to work
in the following way: for a ﬁxed size of the network, π moves according to
the process (15) with µ(n)dn =0 .I fb e n e ﬁts climb to π∗∗ = u(n)θ
∗∗(n), it
will trigger an entry of discrete size n − n that raises the dimension of the
community instantaneously by a jump. The exact form of the trigger θ
∗∗ is
given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If 0 ≤ n0 <n<n, the optimal migration policy for a mass












Proof. See Moretto (2003) and the Appendix
Thus starting at n, if the initial shock is below the known trigger θ
∗(n),
all the migrants wait until θ r i s e st ot h i sl e v e l ,a n dt h e ncoordinate their
entry to bring the size to the optimal level n.W o r k i n gb a c kt o w a r d sn’, it
is veriﬁed for every n,a sl o n ga sθ
∗(n0) is equal to θ
∗(n). In fact, if it were
θ
∗(n0) >θ
∗(n), it could be convenient to delay entry until θ
∗(n),b e c a u s eo fa
higher obtainable beneﬁt. Once the optimal size is reached and to the right
of n, further decision to enter proceeds as explained in the previous section
without externalities. Intuitively, starting at any n0 <n<n,P r o p o s i t i o n
2 locates the optimal entry threshold so as to maximise the total beneﬁts
of the incremental number of members that enter (n − n). The shock value
θ
∗(n) that triggers this individual’s competitive run18 is the same threshold
that justiﬁes a further marginal entry under decreasing beneﬁts.
5C a l i b r a t i o n
To simulate the optimal migration policy we need values for the variables and
parameters in equation (14). We could then calculate (16) and (17) and then
17We exclude the former by using subgame-perfectness arguments (see Moretto (2003)).
18The term competitive run refers to Bartolini’s deﬁnition (1993).
15solve for n∗. To perform this calibration we use the migration ﬂows for Alba-
nians, Filipinos, Chinese and Romanians and the wage levels (deﬂated using
the IRES deﬂator) obtained from the ISTAT database. As we show below,
determining values for most of the model’s inputs is reasonably straightfor-
ward. Estimating the coeﬃcients of the labour demand’s stochastic process
θ and of the Bass probability of integration a and b is more complex as will
be discussed below.
5.1 Basic inputs
The parameters to be calibrated are listed in Table 1: for the discount rate
we have used a basic level ρ2 =0 .03 (Nordhaus,1996) and a higher level
ρ1 =0 .05. We also add a mortality rate λ =0 .001 calculated by the Istituto
Superiore della Sanità19 on ISTAT data.
According to assumption 2 and 3, the diﬀerential wage is assumed to be
a constant percentage of the wage of the host country and varies whether
the immigrant is completely integrated in the host country or not: φi and φ
0
i
respectively. The percentage for complete integration φi has been calibrated
considering the GDP per capita based on Purchasing Power Parity of initial
year 1993, as listed in the International Comparison Programme database of
the World Bank. If the immigrant is not integrate, he earns only a fraction ξ
of the wage. We have calibrated ξ and then the corresponding percentage φ
0
i
referring to the works of Massey (1987), Borjas (1990) and Chiswick (1978)20.
The resulting φ
0
i and φi a r es h o w ni nT a b l e2 .
5.2 Demand volatility
The lack of studies on Italy’s demand function for immigrants21 obliges us
to refer to US works for the level of labour demand elasticity and standard
deviation of the stochastic shock θ.F o rt h eU Sw eh a v em a n yp a p e r st h a tt r y
to estimate the peculiar eﬀect of entering immigrants on the labour wages.
On this basis we use two representative values: ζ1 = −0.2 (Borjas, 1990) and
19www.iss.it
20In particular Massey estimates that the illegal wage is 63% of the legal wage. Borjas
and Chiswick show that the entry wage for each immigrant is 79% or 85 % of the native
one respectively.
21The only work we have found shows a positive elasticity (Venturini (1999)) that the
author justiﬁes as a short-term eﬀect.
16ζ2 = −0.02 (Borjas, 1994). These two values are in line with the literature22.
To calculate an estimate of the variance of θ, we used the boot-strap method,
obtaining two levels of variance σ1 and σ2 for each ﬂow, corresponding re-
spectively to ζ1 = −0.2 and ζ1 = −0.02. These values are reported in Table
3.
5.3 Bass parameters
Finally for the parameters of the Bass model (i.e. a, b, m), we applied a
recursive method proposed by Bass (1969, p. 224) using the years 1996, 1997
and 1998 as initial conditions. The results are described in Table 3. Simple
observations show that in all the cases the coeﬃcient b is greater than a,
which guarantees the concavity of the Bass function Bass(n).
6 Results
To compare the diﬀerent migration inﬂows we simulate the optimal trigger
levels (16) and (17), for the four migration waves, in the case of elasticity
levels −0.02 and −0.2. Because of the diﬃculty of perfectly quantifying the
migration costs, we have normalised K to the same arbitrary level for all
cases23. The principal results are shown in Figures 4 and 5 and are displayed
in Table 4.
22Borjas (1994) reviewing the literature argues that the value of the elasticity should be
between -0.01 and -0.06. Dos Santos (2000) aﬃrms that ”from an empirical point of view,
many studies attempt to estimate the impact of immigration on wages. The elasticity of
wages with respect to the number of immigrants is generally found to be between -0.01
and -0.02”. Garson (1987), using 1985 data, coming from ISEE, ﬁnds a level of elasticity
between -0.01 and -0.04. Borjas (1990), using data from the US census of 1990, shows
a level around -0.2 and in a recent paper (2003) he obtains an elasticity around -0.33.
Antonji and Card (1991), using data of the US census 1970-1980, ﬁnds a level of -0.3.




















































Figure 5: Optimal triggers level for ζ1 = −0,2
Some remarks are in order:
1. In all the ethnic groups, the wave starts when the network size, (n∗
m),
reaches 30% or 40% of the critical saturation level m,f o rζ1 = −0.2
and ζ2 = −0.02 respectively. Yet, the lower the elasticity level the
18greater the wave dimension, that is, as market competition increases
the network eﬀect and the ties among immigrants reduce and they seem
unable to perfectly coordinate entry.
2. The higher the value of the elasticity, the higher the threshold level θ
∗
and the lower the migration ﬂow. This fact depends on the sum of two
eﬀects: (i) the labour market competition, increasing with the absolute
level of ζ; (ii) the network eﬀect that depends on the probability
of being completely integrated (i.e. Bass function). The combined
eﬀect deﬁnes the magnitude of the beneﬁt perceived by every migrant
in the host country. On the one hand, a high number of incumbent
immigrants increases the total beneﬁt due to the network eﬀect. On
the other hand, however, low wave dimensions require a high shock to
trigger entry.
3. A higher ρ magniﬁes the optimal trigger as expected.
4. The highest ﬂows observed in the data are consistent with the predic-
tions of the model (i.e. n∗ with respect to n_1997 in Table 4): the real
wave is between the upper and the lower simulated ﬂow in every case
studied.
5. The higher φ
0
i or φi,t h el o w e rt h ee n t r yt r i g g e rθ
∗ as expected.
In particular it emerges that the Albanian ﬂow is the ﬁrst to start in the
case of low demand elasticity and the second in the case of high elasticity.
This happens just behind the Chinese ﬂow (the second and the ﬁrst, respec-
tively), with wide jump dimensions. Nevertheless, since the historical timing
of the entries shows that the Chinese ﬂow is more recent than the Albanian
one, the level of elasticity on the labour market might be near to ζ2
24.
The timing of the migration phenomenon depends also on the particular
ethnic characteristics summarised in the Bass parameters: the higher the
imitator’s parameter b, the earlier the migration starts. This is due to a high
network eﬀect that oﬀsets labour market competition with a larger wave
dimension. Moreover, the higher the innovator’s parameter a, the lower the
ties among immigrants and the higher the number of ﬁrst entries. This
can explain the diﬀerences in behaviour among the four migration inﬂows
24We remember that, since the labour demand shock is depicted as a Brownian motion
(2), the higher the threshold level, the longer the time elapsed.
19observable in Figures 4 and 5. In fact, the Filipinos, characterised by a
strong individualist behaviour, show a magniﬁed ﬁr s te n t r yb u tar e d u c e d
jump size; vice versa, the Chinese, the Albanians and the Romanians are
characterised by higher imitator parameters and a higher wave.
6.1 Entry costs
So far, we have compared the diﬀerent entry triggers based on normalised
sunk costs K. This normalization allowed the Bass model to describe the
migration behaviour of the ﬂows, by deﬁning the percentage of innovators
and imitators in each ﬂow, thus capturing the implicit signals that drive the
waves.
We can now step back and, following the theory, “quantify” the entry
costs faced by the four diﬀerent ethnic groups by inverting (16) and (17) and
evaluating them at their minimum level25. The results are in Table 5 from
which we can conclude two main insights: (1) The geographical distance
is not the focal element of the sunk costs, as generally stressed in economic
literature. In fact, the Philippines and Romania face a similar K, like Albania
and China. This fact implies that the sunk cost faced by the immigrant must
be a wider basket of socio-economic elements; (2) it is important to stress
that the sunk costs displayed correspond to the optimal threshold: in all the
cases, since the migration occurred in the same year (i.e. 1997), the migrants
entered a labour market with the same shock magnitude. This fact means
that all the ethnic immigrants gained a similar labour market beneﬁt but
faced diﬀe r e n tc o s t s :f o rt h es a m el e v e lo fw a g e ss o m ee t h n i cg r o u p sw e r e
able to face higher costs. Which element made the diﬀerence? The answer
is in the "behavioural rationale": high cooperative behaviour helps each
individual to face a higher cost. Therefore, the timing of the entry should be
inversely related to the sunk cost in the optimum, i.e. Albania ﬁrst, China,
Romania and then Philippines. Comparing this rank with Figures 3 and 4,
it appears that the true labour demand elasticity should be nearer to −0.02.
25In fact, if the jump starts when the trigger reaches the minimum level, we can take
the value of the observed ﬂows (see the 7th column in the Table 4) and the level of the
wage in the year of the peak and substitute these values in the following equation:
K∗ = w∗ β1 − 1












Although the simulations appear to be consistent with the ISTAT data be-
tween 1994 and 2000, we wish to check whether the model is also consistent
over time, by displaying the results of the 2004 CARITAS migration report
in Table 6. According to our model, the Chinese community should be near
to saturation level, but this fact does not correspond to the current data by
CARITAS that shows an increase in Chinese immigration waves.
We suggest two explanations for this. First, our analysis uses the whole
national migration ﬂow as a single community, and this surely overestimates
the alienation eﬀect. We should consider single regional homogeneous ethnic
groups and extend the model in this way. Secondly, due to the particular
method used to calibrate the Bass parameters, the critical saturation level
m is strongly time-dependent. To overcome this problem we have calibrated
the Bass coeﬃcients one and two steps ahead displaying the changes in "be-
havioural rationale" of this procedure.
6.2.1 “One-Two-step-ahead”
In the Bass methodology m depends on the years (initial conditions) used to
calculate the parameters a and b.I np a r t i c u l a rw eh a v eu s e dt h ey e a r s1 9 9 6 ,
1997 and 1998. We now repeat the analysis by using the years 1996, 1997
and 1999 and then 1996, 1997 and 2000. Values for a, b and m are reported
in Table 7 and 8 respectively.
In Figure 6 we show three curves for the Albanian triggers. theta98 is
the benchmark case calibrated with the years 1996, 1997 and 1998, theta99























































Moving ahead t h el a s ty e a ri nc a l i b r a t i n gt h eB a s sp a r a m e t e r sr e s u l t si na
substantial change in the shape of the entry trigger functions. In particular,
m(t) increases from theta98 to theta00 which implies, ceteris paribus, an
increase in the size of the jump. Yet, the network eﬀect is magniﬁed, diluting
the innovators’ weight (this is why θ
∗ increases for n → 0).
The higher the imitators’ coeﬃcient, the greater the perceived satura-
tion dimension will be 26. Therefore, if an ethnic group has strong ties, its
community will probably increase more than other groups, ceteris paribus.
Finally, comparing Tables 3, 7 and 8, we can highlight how the "be-
havioural rationale" changes for the four ﬂows: the Chinese, Albanians and
Romanians become more cooperative, whereas the Filipinos seem to remain
more individualist. This can explain why some communities tend to explode
and others increase at a constant rate.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has tried to explain why migration ﬂows are characterised by
some observable jumps in their processes. Real option theory suggests that
26Comparing the Filipino ﬂow to the Albanian ﬂow we notice that the Albanian growth
rate in the saturation level is higher than the Filipino one (see Tables 7 and 8).
22migration may be delayed beyond the Marshallian trigger since the option
v a l u eo fw a i t i n gm a yb es u ﬃciently positive in the face of uncertainty. In-
tuition is that waiting may resolve uncertainty and thus enable avoidance of
the downside risk of an irreversible investment. Burda (1995) was the ﬁrst
to use real option theory to explain slow rates of migration from East to
West Germany despite a large wage diﬀerential. Subsequent works (Khwaja,
2002; Anam et al., 2004) have developed this approach describing the role of
uncertainty in the migration decision. Recent papers (Moretti, 1998; Bauer
et al., 2004) show, however, that the role of the community is important in
the migration decision. In this paper, we have presented a real option model
where the choice to migrate depends on the diﬀerential wage and on the
probability of being integrated into a host country. The corresponding in-
tegration probability is modelled following the Bass model (1969) where the
"behavioural rationale" of the migration ﬂo w si sc a p t u r e db yt w ok i n d so f
immigrants: innovators or individualists and imitators.T h ew e i g h to fe a c h
diﬀerent type inﬂuences the timing of migration and the size of the commu-
nity. The closer the ties among the individuals, the higher the dimension of
t h ew a v ea n dt h eh i g h e rt h ee n t r yc o s tf a c e d ,ceteris paribus.
Furthermore, we observe two opposing forces that inﬂuence entry: on the
labour market side, strong competition among workers in the host country
delays entry; at the same time, the higher the numbers of immigrants, the
higher the network eﬀect that reduces the optimal threshold and anticipates
the entry.
Simulations of some migration ﬂows to Italy in the last century ﬁtt h e
theoretical approach and are able to replicate the observable migration jumps
at least in the short-run. The model is able to conjecture the induced labour
demand elasticity level of the host country and the "behavioural rationale"
of the migrants. Nevertheless, the use of the national ﬂows, as a proxy for
the size of the communities, probably overestimates the results, suggesting
future disaggregation of the ethnic ﬂows.
23A Appendix
This appendix is dedicated to proving propositions 1 and 2 in the text. To do
this we rely on the works of Leahy (1993), Bartolini (1993), Dixit and Pindyck
(1994) for the case of negative externalities (i.e. a competitive economy), and
Moretto (2003) for the cooperative entry under positive externalities. The
results presented by these authors can be applied with only minor modiﬁ-
cations to the problem at hand. In particular, the special structure of the
immigrant community considered leads to an important simpliﬁcation of the
analysis.
To determine the migrant’s optimal entry policy, the ﬁrst thing to do is
to ﬁnd his value of being perfectly integrated given each individual’s optimal
future entry policy. A solution of (8) can be obtained starting within a time
interval where no entry occurs (n,θ < θ
∗). By the typical methodology of
real options, we are able to obtain the general solution for (8) as (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994, p.181):
V (n,θ)=A1 (n)θ
β1 + A2 (n)θ
β2 + v(n,θ) (18)
where 1 <β 1 <ρ / α ,β 2 < 0 are, respectively, the positive and the negative
root of the characteristic equation Ψ(β)=1
2σ2β(β − 1) + αβ − ρ =0 , and
A1,A 2 a r et w oc o n s t a n t st ob ed e t e r m i n e d .
To keep V (n,θ) ﬁnite as θ becomes small, i.e. lim
θ→0
V (n,θ)=0 , we discard
the term in the negative power of θ setting A2 =0 . Moreover, the boundary
conditions also require limθ→∞{V (n,θ) − v(n,θ)} =0 , where the second
term in the limit represents the discounted present value of the beneﬁt ﬂows
























and Bass(n) ≡ [a+ b−a
m n− b
m2n2],






It is worth noting that for a ≤ b the function u(n),is shaped according to the
Figure 3. Since the last term represents the value of being in the community
24in the absence of new entry, then A1(n)θ
β1 must be the correction due to the
new entry, therefore A1(n) must be negative. To determine this coeﬃcient
for each n, we need to impose some suitable boundary conditions. First of all,
free entry requires the (idle) migrant to expect zero beneﬁts on entry. Then,
indicating with θ
∗(n) the value of the shock θ at which the nth individual
is indiﬀerent to immediate entry or waiting for another opportunity, the









Secondly, the number of migrants n aﬀects V (n,θ) depending on the sign of
θ
∗(n).S i n c eθ
β1 is always positive, any change in n either raises or lowers the
whole function V (n,θ), depending on whether the coeﬃcient A1(n) increases












Thirdly, since each individual rationally forecasts the future path of new
entries by competitors, if θ moves to θ
∗(n + dn), the value of a migrant
conditional on n active immigrants must be equal to the value with n + dn
active, i.e. V (n, θ
∗(n + dn)) = V (n + dn,θ
∗(n + dn)). Taking the diﬀerence
between these two, dividing by dn and taking the limit for dn → 0, we get
Vn(n,θ







In conjunction with the (21), the above extended smooth pasting condition
says that either each migrant exercises his entry option at the level of θ
at which his value is tangent to the entry cost, i.e. Vθ(n,θ
∗(n)) = 0,o r
the optimal trigger θ
∗(n) does not change with n. While the former means
that the value function is smooth at entry and the trigger is a continuous
function of n, 28 the latter case says that, if this condition is not satisﬁed,
27Note that this is a generalisation of the condition in Dixit (1993, p. 35). If the migrant
pretends to be unique or the last entering the host country, then u0(n)=A0(n)=0and
the ﬁrst order condition reduces to Vθ(n,θ
∗(n)) = 0
28Moreover, as we assumed that the individual’s size is inﬁnitesimal, then the trigger
level θ
∗(n) is also a continuous function in n.
25a single individual would beneﬁt from marginally anticipating or delaying
his entry decision. In particular if Vθ(n,θ
∗(n)) < 0 it means that the value
of staying in the host country is expected to increase if θ falls (investing
now will be expected to lead to almost certain beneﬁts), on the contrary if
Vθ(n,θ
∗(n)) > 0 it means that a member would expect to make losses because
of a decrease in θ.I nb o t hs i t u a t i o n s( 2 3 )i ss a t i s ﬁed by imposing
dθ∗(n)
dn =0 ,
therefore the same level of shock may either trigger entry by a positive mass
of migrants or lock-in the community at the initial level of members.29
T h er e s to ft h ep r o o fi sd e v o t e dt os h o w i n gt h a t ,f o rt h en ≤ n0 and for
the n ≥ n, the smooth pasting condition reduces to the traditional one where
Vθ(n,θ
∗(n)) = 0 and θ
∗(n) is increasing in n while, for 0 ≤ n0 <n<n,
Vθ(n,θ
∗(n)) > 0 which implies
dθ∗(n)
dn =0 .
It should be noted that using (20), (21) and (23), it is possible to ﬁnd
the optimal threshold function. The solution depends on the concavity of
u(n). As we have seen in the previous part, a generic representation of u(n)
distinguishes three intervals for the particular shape of the beneﬁt function.
Let’s solve the model backwards.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
For the case of n ≤ n0 or n ≥ n we show two things: (i) the smooth pasting
condition (23) reduces to Vθ(n,θ
∗(n)) = 0; (ii) the optimal trigger θ
∗(n) is
equivalent to that of an individual in isolation, that is of a migrant pretending
to be the last to migrate.
For (i), let’s consider the value of a migrant being in the host country
starting at the point (n,θ < θ
∗), and subject to the possibility of new entries
when θ hits θ
∗. Indicating with T the ﬁr s tt i m et h a tθ reaches the trigger θ
∗,
29If this condition does not hold, the expected beneﬁt gain or loss at θ
∗(n) would be
inﬁnite due to the inﬁnite variation property of the stochastic process θ.
26the optimal entry policy must then satisfy:

















































∗(n)) represents the optimal continuation value of staying in the
host country. Because, by (21), the present value of beneﬁts at T is K,t h e
above value can be written as:










or, after some simpliﬁcations:


















The value of being perfectly integrated (25) is the diﬀerence between the
value of a migrant with a myopic strategy pretending to be the last to have
to migrate
u(n)θ
ρ−α and the value of an idle individual pretending to be the last







¢β1. To choose optimally θ
∗, the






























Since u(n) is decreasing in the interval [n,m],θ
∗(n) is increasing. Moreover,





β1 (ρ − α)
< 0 (28)














from which it is easy to verify that Vn(n,θ) 6=0within the interval θ<θ
∗(n)
and zero at the boundary.
Now for (ii), let’s suppose that all individuals have decided to enter at ˆ θ,
with θ
∗ < ˆ θ. This cannot be a (Nash) equilibrium because a single migrant
can do better by entering at θ
∗.I n f a c t , t h e ﬂow of beneﬁts that each
individual is able to obtain following the policy θ
∗ is the best that he can
do, at least till T. However, by the principle of optimality, this choice is also
optimal for the rest of the period as (24) shows: if the optimal policy of
the single migrant calls for him to be active at ˆ θ tomorrow, it immediately
follows that the optimal policy today is to enter at θ
∗.A s( 2 4 )i sac o n t i n u o u s
function in θ
∗, the limit as ˆ θ → θ
∗ shows that θ
∗ is a Nash equilibrium (Leahy,
1993, proposition 1).
If the elasticity is not too low we obtain an interval n ∈ (0,n 0) where the
competitive eﬀect prevails over the network eﬀect. Therefore, by the above
result, within the interval (0,n 0) the optimal threshold is still given by (27)
until n0.F i n a l l y ,f o rζ → 0, n0 → 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
For 0 ≤ n0 <n<n we have to show three things: (i) that a single indi-
vidual cannot pretend to be the last to migrate and, therefore, the optimal
competitive trigger is no longer equivalent to that of a migrant in isolation;
(ii) that the candidate policy, described in the proposition 2, satisﬁes the
necessary and suﬃcient conditions of optimality; (iii) that it is a sub-game
perfect equilibrium30.
Let assume that u(n) is U-shaped as in the quadrant III of ﬁgure 3. For
(i) and (ii), let’s begin with an idle individual that follows the optimal policy
θ
∗(n).S i n c eθ
∗(n) is decreasing in the interval n<n: the higher the number
of members in the community the greater his entry value. In other words, an
idle migrant would maximise his entry option by pretending to be always the
last to migrate. In fact a migrant that pretends to be the last to enter expects
an inadmissible upward jump in beneﬁts following the policy θ
∗(n). To see
30See Moretto (2003) for a conjecture of how this can be proved.
28this, consider an individual that pretends to have been the last to enter at
θ = θ












β1 (ρ − α)
> 0 (30)
In (30) the inequality holds since it represents the correction due to the new
entry (i.e. A(n)θ
β1 in (20)). This contradicts the smooth pasting condition
Vθ(n,θ
∗(n)) = 0 and then the optimality of θ
∗(n).
To verify that the necessary conditions are satisﬁed, let’s calculate the
value of an (incumbent) immigrant in the host country starting at the point
(n,θ), that would follow a policy deﬁned by two parameters: wait until the
ﬁrst instant T at which the process θ rises to a level c>θ ,corresponding to
an immediate increase in the community size to b>n .Making use of (24)























If each individual were able to choose the best moment for the community’s





























When b and c are chosen according to the candidate policy so that b = n
and c = θ
∗(n) the value function reduces to (20) and the matching value
condition requires V (b,c)=K. These properties verify that the candidate
policy satisﬁes the above ﬁrst order conditions.
By processing (30) we can say more about the necessary conditions. Let
the immigrant, as in (31), wait until the ﬁrst time the process θ rises to
29the trigger level c ≡ θ
∗(b), corresponding to an immediate increase of the
network size to b>n ,and assume also that he expects no more entry after
b. Therefore his expected payoﬀ V (b,θ) from this time onwards equals the





Comparing (32) with (20) gives A1(b)=0 . Therefore to obtain the constant
A1(n), subject to the claim that beyond b no other immigrants will enter,
we substitute (20) into the condition Vn(n,θ






































Substituting (34) into (20), which we rewrite to make explicit its dependence














As long as u(b) >u (n) the ﬁrst term in (35) is positive and it forecasts
the advantage the immigrant would experience by the entry of b − n new
immigrants when θ hits θ
∗(b). T h a ti s ,i fh ew e r ea b l et oc h o o s et h eo p t i m a l
dimension of the jump, it would be b → ¯ n which happens the ﬁrst time that θ
reaches θ
∗(¯ n). Thus, as opposed to before non-sequential entry are possibile,
the necessary conditions would coordinate an optimal simultaneous entry
by ¯ n − n new immigrants. If u00(n) < 0 the necessary conditions are also
30suﬃcients. Furthermore, substituting (35) into the extended smooth pasting

















The term inside square brackets is always positive (i.e. there is no value
n◦ ∈ (n, ¯ n) that makes it nil), and (36) holds with dθ∗
dn =0 .T h a t i s , a l l
immigrants in the range (n, ¯ n) must enter at θ = θ
∗(¯ n).
In other words, as the stochastic process θ is common knowledge, each
immigrant can foresee the beneﬁt from the entry of others and observing the
realization of the state variable θ instantaneously considers when to enter
by maximizing (35). Then, with simultanous entry, the immigrants’ optimal
strategies are easy to ﬁnd: each individual enter as if he is the only to enter
but with the expectation of earning all the network beneﬁts, i.e. θ
∗(¯ n) is a
(symmetric) Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium for all n<¯ n (see Moretto
2003). In addition, as the reaction lags are literally nonexistent, none has
the incentive to deviate from the entry strategy θ → θ
∗(¯ n) and b → ¯ n given
that the others do not deviate. Finally, since θ is a Markov process in levels
(Harrison, 1985, p.5-6), the conditional expectation (31) is in fact a function
solely of the starting states so that, at each date t>0, the immigrant’s
values resemble those described in (35) which makes the equilibrium subgame
perfect.
Finally, it is easy to deal with the general case (quadrant I and II in
Figure 3). If n ∈ (n0,n”) we need ﬁrst to ﬁnd a network size n◦ such that
u(n)=u(n◦) with u0(n◦) > 0 a n dt h e nt op e r f o r mt h es a m ep o l i c ya si n( 3 5 )
or (36). That is, the optimal entry would be of (¯ n−n◦)+(n◦−n) immigrants
the ﬁrst time that θ reaches θ
∗(¯ n).
31BT a b l e s
Parameter Description  Symbol  Source 
Discount rate    ρ1=0,03 
ρ1=0,05 
Nordhaus (1996) 






Wage diferential  φi=(1-w
o/w)  φi  World Bank 





i  World Bank 
Chiswick (1978) 
Borjas (1990) 






i  φi 
Albania 0,639  29/33 
China 0,649  8/9 
Philippines 0,593  5/6 
Romania 0,510  3/4 
 
Table 2: φi and φ
0
i calibration
  Albania China Philippines  Romania 
σ1  0,063 0,061  0,057 0,047 
σ2  0,055 0,055  0,056 0,054 
b  0,973 0,850  0,648 0,828 
a  0,110 0,117  0,141 0,123 
m  0,274 0,138  0,256 0,115 
 
Table 3: The Bass parameters respect to 1996, 1997 and 1998
32Parameters θ
*   n’/m  n’  n
*/m n
* n,  1997 
   Albania     
0,05; -0,2  83,95 0,008 2275  0,33 91000  101634 
0,05; -0,02  12,48 0,000  0  0,42 115150   
0,03; -0,2  22,56 0,004 1225  0,35 96600   
0,03; -0,02  3,33 0,000  0  0,43  118300   
   China     
0,05; -0,2  77,51 0,017 2375  0,30 42000  55352 
0,05; -0,02  13,26 0,000  0  0,41 56000   
0,03; -0,2  20,97 0,008 1125  0,33 45500   
0,03; -0,02  3,55 0,000  0  0,42 58000   
   Philippines     
0,05; -0,2  98,81 0,000  0  0,10 25900  93837 
0,05; -0,02  16,19 0,000  0  0,36 91700   
0,03; -0,2  27,58 0,066 16975 0,23 59850   
0,03; -0,02  4,38 0,000  0  0,38 96250   
   Romania     
0,05; -0,2  85,85 0,023 2625  0,29 34000  44413 
0,05; -0,02  15,73 0,000  0  0,40 46250   
0,03; -0,2  23,17 0,012 1375  0,32 37000   
0,03; -0,02  4,21 0,000  0  0,41 47750   
 
Table 4: Main results
where:
• parameters: are respectively the discount factors (i.e. ρ1 =0 ,05; ρ2 =
0,03) and the elasticity levels (i.e. ζ1 = −0,2; ζ2 = −0,02);
• θ
∗: represents the optimal trigger level at which the migration wave
starts;
• n’/m: is the critical level that “triggers”t h en e t w o r ke ﬀect as a per-
centage of the saturation dimension m;
• n∗/m: is the optimal dimension of the community in percentage of the
theoretic maximum dimension m;
• n∗: is the level of the community that triggers the migration ﬂow;
• n_year (i.e. n_1997) is the empirical jump observed in our data (see
ﬁgure 1).
33K
* Albania China Philippines Romania
ρ1 = 0,05 1,29 1,21 1,00 1,01
ρ2 = 0,03 1,30 1,22 1,00 1,02







Table 6: Caritas report. Numbers of residents for millions of inhabitants,
2004.
t1 Albania China Philippines Romania
b 0,991 0,883 0,652 0,835
a 0,097 0,103 0,137 0,108
m 0,312 0,157 0,262 0,132
Table 7: The Bass parameters respect to 1996, 1997 and 1999
t2 Albania China Philippines Romania
b 1,194 1,077 0,667 0,952
a 0,073 0,086 0,122 0,059
m 0,412 0,189 0,294 0,242
Table 8: The Bass parameters respect to 1996, 1997 and 2000
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